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Abstract 
Focusing on Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, this paper argues that it is not difficult, if one takes a fair 
look at Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en governance, to see legal ways of knowing drawn from specific 
materials. The materials are different from the ones western law draws on, but that does not render them 
less legitimately legal. To get beyond prejudices about what counts as law, settler courts may have to 
begin by admitting that indigenous oral narratives, songs, totem poles and other aspects of material 
culture are legal materials. Then those who work in those courts would have to interrogate that new 
knowledge, and perhaps learn that in getting there by that method they ended up bringing colonialism 
with them. Instead, perhaps we can ask how someone trained as a lawyer in a textual tradition might 
learn to see that a song, a story, a ceremonial robe, or a totem pole, could be law or legal title rather than 
evidence of those things. After all, Canadian jurisdiction is as much a story as anything brought forward 
by the elders who testified in this case. A materialist approach cannot guarantee a better parsing of the 
problems of communication here, but it may shine a brighter light on what counts as jurisdiction and thus 
make it more difficult to accept without question that Canada’s courts have the right to decide a case like 
this. 
This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol23/iss1/4 
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‘You people talk from paper’: 
Indigenous law, western legalism, and 
the cultural variability of law’s materials
Jill Stauffer1
While researching aspects of indigenous oral history in the western part 
of what is currently called Canada, I encountered an anecdote from a 
Southern Tutchone elder from the Yukon. This elder, Mrs. Annie Ned, 
was criticizing a group of scientists at a joint conference of scientists 
and indigenous persons involved in environmental issues facing the 
polar and sub-polar regions of Canada. She said to the scientists: 
‘You people talk from paper’ (Cruikshank 1998: 45). In this essay I 
will discuss why and how this phrase functions as potent criticism of 
how western law and science deal with indigenous groups in settler 
colonial societies and, perhaps, how western law and science deal with 
knowledge in general. To do that I’ll look at a case where two different 
kinds of legal tradition come into conflict—in part because of what 
each of them takes to be law’s materials. The case is called Delgamuukw 
v. British Columbia (hereinafter Delgamuukw). The conflict is between 
Canada and two indigenous groups—the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en—
residing in what is currently called British Columbia.  
1 Law’s outside
I’ll start by thinking about the focus of this collection of essays: law’s 
matters and materials. The legal matters at stake in this essay are 
41
‘You people talk from paper’: Indigenous law, western legalism, 
and the cultural variability of law’s materials
jurisdiction and evidence. For Canadian courts the legal materials 
of this case are statutes, court proceedings, legal decisions, and a 
constitution, in addition to settler colonial legal storytelling and well-
entrenched assumptions about legal legitimacy. For the Gitxsan and 
Wet’suwet’en peoples the legal materials are stories, songs, feasts, and 
material objects. The problem is judgment: who gets to decide? Of 
course, in legal terms, the question ‘who gets to decide’ usually refers to 
jurisdiction. I’ve rendered it a problem of judgment rather than (or in 
addition to) jurisdiction because of what the case is about. The Gitxsan 
and Wet’suwet’en brought Delgamuukw because they wanted Canada 
to acknowledge that they have sovereignty over their lands because 
these lands have never been ceded by treaty or lost in battle. And yet 
Canada claims jurisdiction to decide the case. There is a fundamental 
disconnect here—between the logic of one claim and the logic of the 
other. And so we’re called upon to make a judgment in this case about 
what empowers jurisdiction. Why should Canada’s provincial and 
supreme courts have the power to decide a case in which the Gitxsan 
and Wet’suwet’en assert power over unceded territory? 
I’ve written about the details of this case elsewhere, as have many 
other scholars of law, anthropology, history, and other disciplines; I am 
also in the midst of a larger book project exploring law’s relation to time 
and judgment in this case and others.2 I won’t be able to do justice to the 
complexity of Delgamuukw, nor to the communities who brought the 
case, in this essay. In brief, various chiefs and houses of the Gitxsan and 
Wet’suwet’en peoples sued British Columbia, asking for recognition of 
their rightful ownership of and jurisdiction over lands that have never 
been ceded to Canada. At trial elders told oral histories meant to convey 
proof of longstanding residence in, responsibility for, and relation to 
these lands. The judge at the provincial level (McEachern J) allowed 
the oral histories as evidence rather than excluding them as hearsay, but 
then failed to treat them as capable of conveying legal truth. He ruled 
that the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en did not have standing to bring the 
case because their rights had been effectively extinguished by Canadian 
law prior to the 1982 Constitution Act (an act which establishes that 
the indigenous peoples of Canada have rights not granted by Canada3). 
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The legal argument for this is based on the colonial assumption that 
legislative enactments intended to grant unburdened title to settlers 
were legitimate exercises of power and effectively removed the rights 
of indigenous groups to land, which amounts to saying that settler 
assertion of sovereignty means legitimate rule even if the lands claimed 
are already inhabited by organized societies who did not sign treaties or 
lose battles over territory. Neither justice nor the history of Canadian 
legal rulings fully supports that conclusion.
The case was appealed to Canada’s Supreme Court, where it 
was heard with more fairness, and where the plaintiffs amended the 
pleadings to seek title rather than jurisdiction. The Supreme Court 
found that it was a legal error for the 51 original claims (of the Chiefs 
of various Houses) to amalgamate into two collective claims (Gitxsan 
and Wet’suwet’en) for the higher court ruling, so they ordered a new 
trial without ruling on the legal questions, while also suggesting that 
political negotiation would be better suited than a trial to address the 
problems raised by the case. Despite not ruling on the case’s main 
questions, the Supreme Court overturned the lower court decision that 
title had already been lost, affirming the existence of native title and 
offering some guidelines for how it is to be ascertained. It also ruled 
that indigenous oral narratives must be treated as valid evidence by 
courts hearing cases like these. Thus, though this may not sound like a 
win, it is widely claimed as victory by Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en people 
because of what it overturned and the meaningful precedent it set for 
indigenous land claims in Canada. But even this fairer ruling could 
not get beyond settler colonial assumptions about what constitutes 
legal truth and how truth may be conveyed—I’ll return to that shortly. 
For now, let’s remember that we’re faced with a case where indigenous 
peoples are seeking recognition of jurisdiction over territory that has 
been theirs since long before Canada existed and which has never been 
ceded to Canada, and yet Canada claims jurisdiction to decide the case. 
How might a legal materialist approach help us think about this? On 
the one hand thinking about matters and materials and the differences 
between them potentially illuminates some parts of the problem. On 
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the other hand, I’m uncertain whether the discourse of legal materiality 
as I understand it has much room for settler colonial critique. The legal 
materialist approach sketched in this volume’s introductory essay by 
Hyo Yoon Kang and Sara Kendall seems to focus on the ‘inside’ of 
law by analyzing how certain materials are enlisted in legal matters. 
I challenge this inside/outside premise with this case and argue that 
‘outside’ is more significant than ‘inside’ for changing how we think 
about what settlers owe to indigenous groups. Legal arguments 
sometimes proceed as if there were no ‘outside’ to the stories they tell. 
I claim that there is no such thing as a totality without an outside. 
When something appears to have no outside, that is a function of how 
stories get told about it. But stories can change. 
2 Stories about Law
There is no such thing as an inside with no outside. I’ve begun to make 
that argument by relying on Emmanuel Levinas’ discussion of the 
work skepticism does in the history of philosophy (Levinas 1998: 165-
171). Philosophy claims to have proved skepticism wrong by pointing 
out that it is inconsistent when skepticism makes a truth claim about 
the limits of what truth claims can do. According to skepticism’s critics, 
the skeptic’s claim relies on the thing it says is unreliable (truth) and 
thus the claim fails. Levinas points out that the rebuttal makes sense 
if you think there is only one system of logic. But it is not necessary 
to limit our thinking in that way. That a system is a totality and yet 
has an outside may appear to logic as a problem. It produces questions 
such as: How can something be total and yet not include something? 
Or: How can indigenous groups have sovereignty if they are part of a 
North American sovereign? But, as Levinas will point out, that is only 
a problem within that system. If your aim is to show that no system 
succeeds fully in being a totality, the objection that it defies logic to 
find a surplus to a totality does not make sense. In other words, as 
Levinas argues (in the context of philosophy), the objection that one 
cannot write philosophy without logic presupposes as settled what is 
actually in question: whether there is only one logic operative here or, 
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further, whether all communication must refer back to a system in a 
totality (Levinas 1998: 165-171). In a similar vein, we might argue 
that (in the context of Delgamuukw) the objection that we can’t make 
dependable legal judgments based on forms of evidence that feel 
unfamiliar assumes that jurisdiction—what counts as law and who gets 
to judge—is already settled rather than being the very thing at issue. 
The arguments about evidence in Delgamuukw point to an inability—
or a refusal—of settler colonial courts to take legal pluralism seriously, 
even when they claim to be practicing it. 
But this isn’t a simple story pitting indigenous groups and their 
allies against all lawyers. Plenty of law’s thinkers and practitioners 
would admit that legal pluralism requires more of settler colonial 
courts than what is currently offered. Jeremy Webber reminds us that 
‘all judging presupposes an appreciation of the legitimacy and extent of 
legal orders’—meaning that jurisdiction is a weighty question wherever 
judgment is rendered (Webber 1995: 659). He offers a history of 
compromise and conflict that results in shared normative commitments 
between settlers and indigenous groups in Canada, and shows how the 
development of these commitments—rules and practices—mattered 
even when they emerged from unequal power arrangements. Both sides 
compromised because they needed to find some way to prevent and 
adjudicate conflict and harm. This history has everything to do with 
questions about who gets to decide: 
The issue is precisely about the extent of the non-Aboriginal legal order 
and the possible survival of another order whose origin lies outside the 
unilateral actions of a non-Aboriginal sovereign. A decision to consider 
non-Aboriginal law as the sole source of justiciable norms, applicable 
without qualification to Aboriginal people, would presuppose an 
answer to this fundamental question. (659)
In other words, courts need to reckon honestly with the question 
‘who gets to decide?’ rather than assuming it has been answered. 
Webber’s work shows that Canadian law springs from a plurality of 
legal traditions and thus any decision to impose one form on another is 
domination rather than law—and also misunderstands Canada’s legal 
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history. So, if the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en claim jurisdiction over a 
territory and Canada asserts jurisdiction to decide whether their claim 
is true, it isn’t simply the case that the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en are 
wrong that they have jurisdiction. Instead it makes Audra Simpson’s 
point that ‘there is more than one political show in town’ (Simpson 
2014: 11). That power tends to decide the issue does not change the 
meaning of the conflict, that what Canada calls law is not the only 
thing that operates as law in this region. 
That gives us a different way to think about the legal materialist 
focus on the ways in which legality is made. There are multiple forms 
of law, multiple things that build worlds, and those things may be 
incommensurable even when they operate in the same spaces. Maybe 
a legal materialist lens would help here because, as Kang and Kendall 
also write, ‘a legal materialist approach turns from knowledge of 
legal concepts (as with the doctrinal study of law) to legal ways of 
knowing and the materials that law draws upon’ (Kang and Kendall, 
Introduction: 3). It is not difficult, if one takes a fair look at Gitxsan 
and Wet’suwet’en governance, to see legal ways of knowing drawn 
from specific materials. The materials are different from the ones 
western law draws on, but that does not render them less legitimately 
legal. (I’m about to trouble that way of framing the problem, however.) 
Nonetheless, the judgment in the provincial ruling in Delgamuukw 
proceeded as if non-Aboriginal law were the ‘sole source of justiciable 
norms’ (Webber 1995: 659).
In Delgamuukw, Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en elders came to court 
to tell their oral narratives—called adaawk and kungax, respectively—
because these are legal materials. The elders came to court to share their 
knowledge because these stories, heard well, prove long term occupancy 
and land-use, establish where fishing sites are and who is authorized 
to use them, describe legal and social practices of various kinds, offer 
a history of Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en involvement with the land and 
with kin and clan, and much more. For the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en 
peoples, these stories aren’t evidence of title to land, they are title to 
land—or they are something similar to what a settler colonial legalist 
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conception of land and property calls title.4 The performance of these 
stories at key moments is what creates and maintains the system of 
traditional laws that governs the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en peoples. The 
Judge in Delgamuukw thought he had done his job by allowing these 
materials into his courtroom. But, though he admitted the stories into 
evidence, he failed to learn how to hear them as legal materials—and 
that is one reason why his judgment was unjust. That this is the outcome 
is perhaps unsurprising. But it is not impossible to imagine a different 
kind of hearing, where instead of shoring up established procedures 
that can only extend a legacy of colonial domination, all involved are 
able to recognize what they do not yet know and then seek to learn 
how different kinds of legal materials work. But even if we managed 
to get past power and into fairness, would recognizing indigenous 
stories, songs, and material culture as legal materials be good enough?
3 Oral Narrative as Legal Material
Let’s return to where we began. Mrs. Annie Ned’s larger comment 
was: ‘Where do these people come from, outside? You tell different 
stories from us people. You people talk from paper—Me, I want to talk 
from Grandpa’ (Cruikshank 1998: 45).5 That addition—‘I want to talk 
from Grandpa’—makes it clear that we’re dealing with the difference 
between storing knowledge in documents and passing it down through 
oral narratives. But even that characterization I’ve just made, while 
accurate, misses something about the difference being pointed to in 
Mrs. Ned’s comment. 
Julie Cruikshank shows what is distinctive about knowledge stored 
in oral forms by describing how she was taught by elders and then 
discussing the different things a single narrative can mean depending 
on who tells it to whom and in what context. In The Social Life of 
Stories, Cruikshank argues that narratives passed down orally over 
generations are not only a resource for learning about the past of a 
culture defined by an oral tradition, but also ‘provide a foundation for 
evaluating contemporary choices and for clarifying decisions made’ at 
various stages of life (xii). The stories, embedded in a context, build 
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on shared knowledge, and yet they also have the power to ‘subvert 
official orthodoxies and to challenge conventional ways of thinking’ 
(xiii). However, it took some time, and some willingness to adjust her 
expectations, for her to learn this. Cruikshank arrived at the scene of her 
fieldwork in the Yukon with a typical set of anthropological concerns: 
she was interested in the Klondike gold rush, cooperative relationships 
between Tlingit and Tutchone peoples, the construction of the Alaska 
highway, and the effects of those changes on the lives of people who 
were native to that region. With each elder she met, and each such 
anthropological question she posed, she was told, patiently but firmly, 
that she must begin by recording stories. And so, she listened to stories 
while also worrying that things were going off the rails. Then she began 
to understand that the elders were ‘consciously providing me with a 
kind of cultural scaffolding, the broad framework I needed to learn 
before I could begin to ask intelligent questions’ (27). She was being 
offered an education in how to approach knowledge as Tutchone and 
Tlingit peoples do. In describing for us her own process of learning, 
Cruikshank opens up a view into a way of thinking that is not inferior 
to text-based knowledge, but is sufficiently different that, because it is 
also marginalized by unequal power arrangements, is always in danger 
of being treated as inferior or at the very least misunderstood in such 
a way that injustice is the result.
What does it mean to say ‘you people talk from paper’? You might 
say it’s the flipside of the western attitude ‘you people don’t even record 
your histories on paper!’ The belief that oral histories are deficient 
relative to written ones fails to understand that knowledge may take 
different forms and that ideas may be retained over time in practices 
other than writing. The truth of this is also reflected in the western/
Anglo legal tradition. Marianne Constable’s The Law of the Other does 
a good job of showing how, even in the history of England, the writing 
of law may be the mark of a sovereign imposing his will on a conquered 
people, that writing down rules that had not yet been written changes 
their character, and that it is not necessary to presume that rules are 
writable in order to be able to follow them (Constable 1994: 67-95). 
There is a presumption that people with oral traditions or ‘unwritten 
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rules’ just haven’t gotten around to writing down their histories yet. But 
that assumes that oral tradition says and does what a settler colonial 
subject thinks history or law or geography or religion say and do. And 
that is not true. 
First of all, an oral narrative is not always the same, even if it tells 
the same story. Who is doing the telling, to whom, for what reason 
and in what setting — all of that will mean that both the telling 
and the hearing are likely to differ over time. That is not so hard to 
understand if you stop and think about how, when you read a book or 
watch a movie more than once, it often does not mean exactly the same 
thing both times. But let’s not colonize the form entirely by thinking 
we get what’s at stake because we sometimes read books more than 
once. Cruikshank tells the story of an oral narrative imparted to her 
by the elder Angela Sidney, about separation, loss, and return. A man 
named Kaax’achgook goes to hunt seal, is warned by spirits that it 
is not safe for him to do so and thus returns home. After some time 
passes, he gets sad that he isn’t providing for his family and decides to 
go back out hunting, and then gets lost when his boat gets caught in a 
storm and he is marooned on an island. He is gone for a year and his 
relatives think he is dead, but during that time he harvests many seals 
and otters, observes the position of the sun at sunrise and sunset every 
day, and uses that to figure out when and how to sail back home. It’s 
a long story with a lot of (what a settler’s ear might impatiently call) 
wandering but three of its main themes are: ‘I gave up my life out on 
the deep for the shark’; ‘The sun came up and saved people’; ‘I gave 
up hope and then dreamed I was home’ (Cruikshank 35). You can see 
from my short characterization that the story teaches something about 
maritime navigation, about making the best of a bad situation, about 
failing to listen to spirits, about not losing hope, about wanting to be 
home, and so on.
The first time Sidney tells the story to Cruikshank, it is as a story 
about why she is authorized to tell the story — there is an embedded 
story about how her clan rather than another came to be authorized to 
tell this tale.6 The second time Cruikshank hears the story (eleven years 
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later), it is when Sidney’s son, who fought in WWII, is visiting and 
Sidney wants to communicate that he had been gone so long, across the 
sea, that she had worried he was dead, but that he returned home. The 
third time Cruikshank hears the story it was at the opening of a college 
in the Yukon, and this time it was told to make the point that, now that 
they had their own college, they would no longer lose their children 
to Vancouver. Sidney didn’t add those metadiscursive explanations to 
the tellings but rather relied on the story to communicate in its context 
what it needed to tell in that moment. This is what stories can do for 
people who are deeply enmeshed in a tradition and taught that story 
is a cooperative enterprise from which lifelong learning is possible.
In the provincial courtroom in Delgamuukw, lawyers for the state 
and province worried that this variability allows too much license 
and not enough stability to do justice. That worry betrays a lack of 
knowledge of how these oral narratives operate in their specific cultural 
setting. The stories may vary, but only in pre-established, acceptable 
ways. For instance, in the Gitxsan context, when an adaawk gets 
recounted at a feast, every guest Chief who is there as witness serves 
in the role of niid’nt, ‘the ones who approve.’ As Val Napoleon puts it, 
‘the witnessing and approval must be publicly declared to effect any 
change in social standing. In this way, the feast is a public, interactive, 
and highly political process, conducted with extreme tact and subtlety’ 
(Napoleon 2005: 126-7). No one has the power to change these kinds of 
stories without broad social support. It should not be difficult for judges 
or lawyers in settler colonial courts to understand this, given that the 
law on which they rely also must be both stable and responsive to survive 
the passing of time. (And some of that law will be common law, which 
isn’t ‘written’ in the same way a statute is. That makes the prejudice 
against ‘unwritten law’ even more interesting.7) In settler colonial legal 
institutions there are rules and procedures for change that all involved 
parties understand, much like how those in attendance at a Gitxsan 
feast understand what may and may not happen there. Settler colonial 
courts also bear witness to how legal rules and principles are interpreted 
differently over time. So, a written text may offer a different kind of 
stability than does an oral narrative, but even a written legal text’s 
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stability is manifestly flexible. Nonetheless, lawyers for the province 
and state in the Delgamuukw case tried to undermine the oral narratives 
told by elders by looking for inconsistencies in their telling. They did 
not look for inconsistencies in their own story of law, even though their 
case is built on quite a few, including the problem of jurisdiction. Nor 
did they try to learn how Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en stories preserve 
knowledge over time in ways different from how settler colonial legal 
documents do. In other words, they did not seek to know how Gitxsan 
and Wet’suwet’en stories work as legal materials, and that means they 
were not able to hear the stories or ask meaningful questions about them.
That might lead us to embrace an argument like, ‘we must learn 
how to hear indigenous oral narratives as legal materials or as valid 
evidence.’ Perhaps that is an imperfect initial step forward. However, 
with oral history, both the reasons for being and the aim of a story may 
differ substantially from a form that values stability over change. So, 
while worries lawyers have about the possibility of error or unreliability 
in indigenous stories ‘may not take sufficient account of the checks 
and balances in language, people, and culture that help sustain such 
memories,’ those same worries may miss that there is, as John Borrows 
points out, ‘something quite different going on in the transmission of 
oral history than the mere recording of events’ (Borrows 2001: 10). 
When Mrs. Annie Ned says ‘you people talk from paper’ she’s not only 
voicing a criticism of how settler colonial knowledge is conveyed but of 
how those who are embedded in its ways learn to think and listen. They 
look for universal truths and controlled experiments, and think data 
provides an answer to every question. They call history authoritative 
when it is contained in a text that does not change, even though their 
own lives could easily teach them how the past resounds in the present 
moment differently over time. And so settler colonial subjects may 
not see that it is fully possible to have a deep understanding of how 
the world works that emerges differently—that does not rely on the 
‘dead’ letter of a text. And also, they tend to listen to an oral narrative 
in order to turn it into a text that can then be read like any other text. 
But that is exactly the right way to fail to understand what is at stake 
in different ways of world-building.
51
‘You people talk from paper’: Indigenous law, western legalism, 
and the cultural variability of law’s materials
4 Legal materials in the courtroom
In the provincial hearings in Delgamuukw, McEachern J could not 
accept that oral history might be authoritative about anything, but 
he could not see that he had that prejudice because, according to his 
reasoning, he had allowed it all in court and listened to it and thus had 
been fair. The Judge could not hear oral history as being legal title to 
land (as the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en peoples say that it is) and he 
could not get past the ‘supernatural’ elements that, to his ear, can only 
be mythical and thus not-true.8 Even the Canadian Supreme Court’s 
later, much more fair ruling said something like: in the absence of 
written records, conclusive evidence would be hard to come by, so oral 
histories must be taken seriously. One version of this, from Chief Justice 
Lamer, reads: ‘Since conclusive evidence of presovereignty occupation 
may be difficult, an aboriginal community may provide evidence of 
present occupation as proof of presovereignty occupation in support 
of a claim to aboriginal title’ (Delgamuukw 1997). This just-sounding 
claim misses a very important point, that for these peoples and their 
traditions, oral histories are conclusive evidence. We think from paper. 
But that sentence I just wrote, that ‘for these peoples and their 
traditions, oral histories are conclusive evidence,’ is, like the wording the 
Canadian Supreme Court chose, not quite right. A settler colonial way of 
approaching this problem would be to say, well, the courts just need 
to learn to accept oral histories as conclusive evidence, as valid legal 
materials. But that strikes me as not good enough—it still aims to 
colonize a form of indigenous governance by making it conform to 
settler colonial legalism.9 Instead, perhaps we can ask how someone 
trained as a lawyer in a textual tradition might learn to see that a song, 
a story, a ceremonial robe, or a totem pole could be law or legal title 
rather than evidence of those things.10
This is where a legal materialist approach might help. Kang and 
Kendall write: ‘with the concept of jurisdiction, for example, the 
observer’s epistemological task of self-reflection is to trace how the 
abstract idea of jurisdiction is brought into being by delineating and 
qualifying the relations amongst constitutive parts that comprise it’ 
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(Kang and Kendall, Introduction: 13). If jurisdiction for a Canadian 
court comes from a constitution, laws, legal precedent, treaties, and 
other such legal materials (this is what gets argued, even if domination is 
the more truthful answer), that gives us a text-heavy way of determining 
where power lies in this case.11 But if our task is to delineate and qualify 
the relations among the constitutive parts that comprise something like 
jurisdiction, or to identify ‘the materials through which law operates, 
and how they are enlisted in the production of legality’ (Kang and 
Kendall, Introduction: 13), then it shouldn’t be impossible to see that 
jurisdiction for Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en peoples comes from stories, 
songs, and material objects other than paper. They don’t talk from paper. 
We still haven’t solved the problem that power tends to decide 
the answer to this conflict. But maybe a materialist approach helps 
elucidate things that might not otherwise be seen? This approach might, 
for instance, shine a brighter light on the gaping holes in Canadian 
jurisdiction over the area of British Columbia in question. Canadian 
jurisdiction is as much a story as anything brought forward by the elders 
who testified in this case. That an incomplete and one-sided story was 
once written down and turned into law does not, on its own, make 
that story more authoritative than one that has been passed down in 
living speech across many years and over multiple generations.1 Basic 
respect dictates that we acknowledge that and deal with what it means 
for law in settler colonial states. 
5 Beyond the text
In her essay ‘Law’s materiality,’ Kang writes: ‘Although legality is 
materialized through different media and the latter shapes the scope 
and meaning of law, law is predominantly a hermeneutic practice 
operating in a textual mode, which is implicated with many other 
representational practices’ (Kang 2018: 464). It is no secret that western 
law operates in a textual mode. But it may be possible for those of 
us who inherit that tradition to see beyond its texts, or to recognize 
1  See Constable M on the difference between law as propositional statement 
and law as practice.
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that its texts are materials that may mean different things across time 
and place. To get beyond our prejudices about what counts as law, we 
may have to begin by admitting that indigenous oral narratives, songs, 
totem poles and other aspects of material culture are legal materials. 
Then we would have to interrogate that new knowledge, and perhaps 
learn that in getting there by that method we ended up bringing 
colonialism with us.
The work I’ve been doing on Levinas’ ideas about skepticism points 
us in a similar direction. You are reading this argument rather than 
hearing me speak it. Thus, the argument is stuck in its original moment 
of writing, unable to respond to changing conditions and any new 
knowledge I might gain in dialogue with you or the larger world. Those 
are the conditions. That might leave us hopeless if we didn’t admit that 
writing rarely communicates only what is written. As Levinas puts it, 
every book gets its audience, and is part of a world it does not include, 
and even when you read to yourself rather than speaking with others you 
are participating in a world where the book is one structure but there 
are also other structures. As he points out, ‘the permanent return of 
skepticism does not so much signify the possible breakup of structures 
as the fact that they are not the ultimate framework for meaning, that 
for their accord repression can already be necessary’ (Levinas 1998: 
169). If we attend to that truth rather than clinging to the authority 
of texts, we might catch sight of the repressive force required to make 
legal meaning adhere only to text. And learning to see that is one way 
to begin to unsettle settler colonialism.
Endnotes
1. Associate Professor of Peace, Justice, and Human Rights, Haverford 
College. I am indebted to ongoing conversation about law’s matters and 
materials with Sara Kendall and Hyo Yoon Kang, and the network of 
thinkers they have gathered together around this project; and to the LTC 




2. The forthcoming book is tentatively titled Lapse Time: Interruption and 
Resistance in International Criminal Law and the Settler Colonial State. 
The essay is Stauffer 2019. Selections from among the vast scholarly 
literature on Delgamuukw include: Wa G and D Uukw 1989; Borrows J 
1999; Christie G 2005; Cruikshank J 1992; Gover BJ and ML Macaulay 
1996; Reiter EH 2010.
3. Constitution Act of 1982, Section 35: ‘(1) The existing aboriginal and 
treaty rights of the aboriginal people in Canada are hereby recognized 
and affirmed. (2) In this Act, “Aboriginal Peoples of Canada” includes 
the Indian, Inuit, and Métis Peoples of Canada.’
4. See Bryan B 2011 for an interesting analysis of what happens when a 
settler colonial court imposes an alien frame on another culture’s self-
understanding. See also Anker K 2005 for a meditation on how things 
other than written texts work as legal materials. 
5. I originally developed some of these ideas in a blog post. See Stauffer J 2017.
6.  Many societies organized around transmission of oral stories have rules 
about who can tell certain stories, who can hear them, and in what setting 
they may be told. Some stories are only for feasts, only for chiefs, only 
for certain Houses, and so on. Ideas about jurisdiction reside within these 
constraints. For instance, when I paid a Gitxsan guide to teach me how to 
understand the totem poles of Anspay’axw (or Kispiox), he told me some of 
the stories, told me that he couldn’t tell me others, and then said there was 
one story he could tell because it was under his father’s authority, but only 
if I agreed never to tell it, because I bear no connection to that authority. 
7. However, see Constable M for a good reading of the difference between 
common law ‘unwritten law’ and law that transpires in action as practical 
knowledge.
8. For instance, in the courtroom, when, after presenting all the adaawk-
based evidence, the lawyer for the plaintiffs asserted that the adaawx are 
told in court for the truth of their contents, McEachern J interrupted 
with this question: ‘Well, do you advance Mrs. Johnson’s evidence about 
the destruction of the village by a supernatural bear as proof of that fact? 
That’s what you just said, I think.’ Delgamuukw 28 May 1987: 738. This 
shows that the judge had not developed the capacity to hear the story that 
Antgulilbix/Mrs. Mary Johnson told about a bear with unusual powers—a 
story that, if heard well, can establish a history of dwelling in specific areas 
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of land (and so, offer evidence of continued residence) as well as giving 
reasons for a move from one location to another (a landslide). It does much 
more than that—within the story there are instructions for how to mourn 
properly, a history of how fishing is conducted in specific sites, etc.
9. Bryan B 2011 makes this point well.
10. See Anker K 2005 for an analysis of this problem in the Australian context.
11. Valverde M 2011 makes an interesting argument about how the court in 
this case, when faced with the difficulty of determining the weight and 
admissibility of indigenous legal materials, turned away from legal doctrine 
and toward a medieval idea of the ‘honor of the Crown,’ found in the 
language of ‘fiduciary duty’ in Delgamuukw and other contemporary cases 
dealing with both indigenous land claims and the ‘duty to consult.’ This 
strategy conveniently skirts difficult jurisdictional issues while shoring up 
Canadian sovereignty by assuming that ‘the Crown’ is always honorable—
which can be a tough argument to sell in an indigenous land claims case. 
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